MMSL 2023, 92(3):235-246 | DOI: 10.31482/mmsl.2022.045

ON THE INVOLVEMENT OF CBRN AND MEDICAL SPECIALISTS IN THE EXPLOITATION OF FACILITIES SUSPECTED FOR THE PRESENCE OF BIOLOGICAL MATERIALOriginal article

Radim Zahradníček ORCID...1*, Tomáš Rozsypal ORCID...2, Hynek Schvach ORCID...3
1 Chemical Corps Section, NBC Defence Institute, University of Defence, Víta Nejedlého 1, Vyškov, Czech Republic
2 Chemical and Radiological Protection Section, NBC Defence Institute, University of Defence, Víta Nejedlého 1, Vyškov, Czech Republic
3 Department of Military Medical Service Organisation and Management, Faculty of Military Health Sciences, University of Defence, Třebešská 1575, Hradec Králové, Czech Republic

The existence of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons poses a significant problem in terms of possible proliferation of technologies and materials, despite international agreements and regulations. The role of military forces in operations can be to support counter-proliferation initiatives to prevent their acquisition, deployment, or employment. The article analyzes the current situation in the field of site exploitation under CBRN environments, with a specific focus on biological threats. It describes a current state and a research question, which is addressed on the basis of scenario analysis methodology. The result is a scenario for the activities of troops in CBRN environments, which illustrates the possible operational reality during the localization of biological sites, their characterization and exploitation. The following application part presents proposals for the division of phases of the exploitation process and a proposal for the determination of CBRN and medical specialists of the Czech Armed Forces as the implementation elements.

Keywords: Biological Weapon; CBRN Incident; Exploitation; Proliferation; Reconnaissance; Weapons of Mass Destruction

Received: July 4, 2022; Revised: September 12, 2022; Accepted: October 5, 2022; Prepublished online: January 19, 2023; Published: September 1, 2023  Show citation

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Zahradníček, R., Rozsypal, T., & Schvach, H. (2023). ON THE INVOLVEMENT OF CBRN AND MEDICAL SPECIALISTS IN THE EXPLOITATION OF FACILITIES SUSPECTED FOR THE PRESENCE OF BIOLOGICAL MATERIAL. MMSL, 92(3), 235-246. doi: 10.31482/mmsl.2022.045
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